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Law and policy implications of the precautionary principle in the field of marine
environmental protection are explored in this paper in a three-part analysis. First,
seven slippery aspects of the precautionary principle are highlighted, including confusion in terminology, definitional variations, definitional generalities, the spectrum
of precautionary measures available, ongoing philosophical tensions and competing
socioeconomic interests, debate over who should be responsible for making precautionary decisions, and limited interpretation by international tribunals. Second, the
rather feeble precautionary responses to the tempestuous issues of climate change,
hazardous chemicals, and overfishing are described. Third, the potential for the
precautionary principle to synergize with human rights norms, such as the emerging
right to a healthy environment, and other principles of sustainable development is
discussed.
Keywords climate change, fisheries, ocean governance, marine environment, precaution, sustainable development

Introduction
The precautionary principle is surging over the shores of marine environmental protection.1 Almost every international environmental agreement and declaration in the past
decade has voiced the notion that when an activity, such as proposed pollution or a
coastal development, carries the potential for serious environmental harm, decision makers
should err on the side of caution.2 Scientific certainty of dead fish or diseased bodies
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should not be waited for; precautionary actions should be taken now. From climate
change to biodiversity protection, precautionary measures are being urged.3
A prime reason for the international popularity of precaution is its reflection of
common sense notions evident in numerous cultures. The precautionary principle promises to give practical effect to such sayings as, “better safe than sorry”; “an ounce of
prevention is worth a pound of cure”; “a stitch in time saves nine.”4
While numerous other normative principles, such as intergenerational equity, public
participation, community-based management, integration, and ecosystem management
are driving marine environmental protection reforms,5 the precautionary principle is
often referred to as one of the most fundamental principles given its far-reaching implications for decision making.6 The principle promises to be the “big balancer” in
sustainable development by reversing the burden of proof to proponents of change/
development to demonstrate some level of acceptability or safety.7
However, getting a clear “normative fix” on the precautionary principle is difficult.
The principle is often called “elusive” given its general nature and still limited international implementation.8 The law and literature relating to the precautionary principle has
been described as in “disarray,” with great confusion over meaning and detachments
from relevant social science and legal literature.9
Three images, explored in this article, help capture the present law and policy reality, namely slippery shores, rough seas, and rising normative tides. The precautionary
principle remains slippery for various reasons, including widely varying definitions, ongoing philosophical debates, and the numerous precautionary measures possible. The
principle is also facing a rough ride in at least three key areas of marine environmental
protection. Weak, rather limited embraces of precaution have occurred in addressing the
crises of climate change, hazardous chemicals, and overfishing. The principle also has
potential for synergizing with other normative currents, including developments in human rights law, such as the emerging right to a healthy environment and the evolving
environmental rights of indigenous peoples, and other principles of sustainable development like intergenerational equity.

Slippery Shores
The precautionary principle is slippery in at least seven ways. Uncertainties arise from
terminology, definitional variations, definitional generalities, the spectrum of precautionary measures, ongoing philosophical debates and differing socioeconomic interests,
vagueness over who should be responsible for precautionary decisions, and limited
interpretation by international tribunals. A discussion of national legislative variations10
and differing interpretations by national courts and tribunals,11 another slippery aspect, is
beyond the scope of this article
Terminology
Debate has occurred over the proper terminology, precautionary principle, or precautionary approach, and whether the terms principle and approach have differing meanings. The United States and Canada, in their trade challenge against the European Union’s
ban on beef from countries using growth hormones, argued for the term precautionary
approach as it denotes a softer, nonbinding nature.12
In the international fisheries management field, initiatives led by the Food and
Agriculture Organization (FAO), such as the FAO Code of Conduct for Responsible
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Fisheries,13 have preferred precautionary approach since the term is viewed as avoiding
extreme implications such as reversing the burden of proof to fishers to show no environmental harm and the imposition of moratoria on fishing activities.14
Some commentators have suggested the terms principle and approach are essentially synonymous .15 The Rio Declaration on Environment and Development16 itself uses
both the terms principle and approach.17 To ensure the potential distinction is kept in
mind, some authors have used the wording precautionary principle/approach.18
Definitional Variations
Over a dozen different definitions of the precautionary principle occur in international
conventions, declarations, and documents.19 Therefore, it is difficult to “nail down” the
exact parameters, for example, what should trigger the application of the principle.
The variations in the trigger may be seen in the Rio Declaration and the Ministerial
Declaration of the Second Conference on the Protection of the North Sea (The London
Declaration). The Rio version of precaution calls for application of the precautionary
approach where an activity threatens “serious or irreversible damage,”20 while the London Declaration would trigger precaution on the basis of an activity “likely to cause
damage or harm.”21
Definitional Generalities
Perhaps the most widely used articulation of the precautionary principle/approach is
drawn from Principle 15 in the Rio Declaration:
In order to protect the environment, the precautionary approach shall be widely
applied by States according to their capabilities. Where there are threats of
serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be
used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental degradation.
The definition is loaded with generalities. What exactly does serious and irreversible
harm mean? What is lack of full scientific certainty? What are cost-effective measures?
The wording “according to their capabilities” suggests precaution may be extremely
malleable.22
Academic efforts to clarify the meaning of the precautionary approach have also
left considerable fuzziness. For example, core elements of precaution have been suggested:

· willingness to take action in advance of formal proof,
· proportionality of response,

· provision of ecological space and margins of error,

· recognition of the well-being interests of nonhuman entities,
· a shift in the onus of proof onto those who propose change,
· concern for intergenerational impact on future generations,
· recognition of the need to address ecological debts.23

Key questions remain with the general checklist. For example, what type of proof
should proponents of change be required to establish before approval is granted?24 How
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wide should margins of error be?25 How much value should be accorded to species and
habitats in light of human needs for food and resources?26
Spectrum of Precautionary Measures
The precautionary principle/approach is also slippery because of the wide spectrum of
available management measures. Direct and extreme measures to encourage precaution
include outright prohibitions on certain human activities, such as nuclear technology or
new aquaculture developments; designation of “no take” areas; and “reverse listing” for
pollutants or wastes where only pollutants/wastes listed on a “safe list” would be allowed to be used or discharged.27
An example of a direct/extreme approach at the international level is in ocean dumping, where the 1996 Protocol28 to the London Convention 197229 requires a precautionary reverse listing approach where only wastes listed on a “safe list” may be disposed of
at sea30 and only after government regulators require a waste assessment.31
Direct but less extreme measures include requiring pollution prevention or waste
minimization plans as a precondition to licensing industrial operations32 and mandating
decision makers to apply the precautionary principle/approach without strict guidelines.33
Indirect measures include requiring environmental impact assessments of proposed projects
and proposed governmental programs, plans, and policies to identify environmental impacts and mitigation options; ensuring strict or absolute liability regimes for pollution
damage; and encouraging public participation in all aspects of decision making to provide “common sense” perspectives.34
Practical implications of the precautionary approach to fisheries management have
also been subject to debate with numerous management measures possible.35 Those measures include, among others,

· establishing cautious quotas;

· terminating open access fisheries and developing management plans within a certain time frame;

· prohibiting or strictly regulating destructive fishing techniques and promoting selective, environmentally friendly fishing technologies/methods;

· requiring environmental assessment before opening a new fishery;

· including environmental nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and nonfishery
users in fisheries management;

· promoting consideration of fisheries in integrated coastal area management
· allowing fish stocks to spawn at least once;
· setting aside marine protected areas.

Differing Viewpoints and Socioeconomic Interests
The conceptual shores of precaution are also slickened by competing philosophical and
cultural values and socioeconomic interests, where persons often disagree over how precautionary society should be.36 Persons with an ecocentric worldview will likely favor
strong precautionary measures based upon a risk-adverse attitude37 and a belief in individual rights, such as a right to a clean, healthy environment.38 Persons with a transcendent worldview are likely to be more risk-taking, open to making cost–benefit or
risk–benefit tradeoffs and more amenable to reliance on scientific proof. 39 Cultural attitudes may also vary, as exemplified by differing risk perceptions towards genetically
modified organisms in Europe and the United States.40
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One of the major unresolved tensions in the precautionary debate is the appropriate
roles for science and economics versus the roles of public beliefs and perceptions.41 One
of the reasons why the precautionary principle/approach has become so controversial is
that it challenges the dominant approach to public administration, which has emphasized
technical rationality and the scientific-analytical mindset.42 One of the central battlefields
has been and will likely continue to be over the appropriate role of scientific risk assessment in decision making.43 Uncertainties continue over the extent to which countries
may prohibit or restrict trade, for example, in genetically modified foods, based upon
sociocultural risk perceptions rather than scientific assessment.44 The appropriateness of
cost–benefit and risk–benefit analysis is also subject to considerable debate.45
Personal interests in resource exploitation may also complicate the picture with socioeconomic needs and demands fuelling less precautionary viewpoints.46 For example, a
proponent of offshore mineral development or aquaculture expansion may be mesmerized by the benefits, while traditional fishers may rally over the potential costs.47
The Appropriate Decision Maker or Interpreter
A further slippery issue area relating to precaution is sorting out who should be endowed with making precautionary determinations and judgments.48 Some might argue
that politicians, given their elected status, are the best arbiters of competing social values.
Expert administrators might be supported because of their special skills and knowledge.
Others might argue for judges to play a proactive role in interpreting the content of
precaution given the lobbying pressures and short-term election interests facing politicians and the need to foster justice, including ecosystem values.49 The creation of new
precautionary institutions and mechanisms might also be argued for, such as independent regulatory boards or agencies to oversee risk assessments and make risk management decisions.50 More participatory mechanisms, such as multistakeholder task forces
and alternative dispute resolution techniques, may also be envisaged.51
Limited Interpretation by International Tribunals
Precautionary interpretation by international tribunals has been limited. In New Zealand
v. France,52 the majority of the International Court of Justice dismissed the case on
jurisdictional grounds and did not address New Zealand’s arguments regarding the precautionary principle. New Zealand had argued that France, before proceeding with further underground nuclear testing in the South Pacific, should be required to undertake
additional environmental impact assessment and should bear the burden of proof to show
in advance that its activities would not cause environmental contamination. In the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion,53 Judge Weeramantry, in
a dissenting opinion, indicated that nuclear weapon use would violate a number of principles of environmental law, including the precautionary principle, but no detailed analysis
of precaution was provided.54 In the Hungary v. Slovakia case,55 Hungary argued that
the precautionary principle obliges all countries to prevent environmental damage and
that Hungary, therefore, should be able to terminate a 1977 Treaty with Czechoslovakia
(later Slovakia) which called for the construction of a series of joint barrages along the
Danube river with uncertain environmental consequences. The Court, while not rejecting
the relevance of the precautionary principle, avoided a detailed discussion of its legal
implications. 56
In the Southern Bluefin Tuna cases,57 involving legal action by Australia and New
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Zealand seeking to stop Japan from unilaterally increasing catch levels of southern bluefin tuna beyond previously agreed upon treaty allocations, the International Tribunal for
the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) granted provisional measures ordering Japan to refrain
from further “experimental fishing” (except with the agreement of the parties or under
an experimental catch counted against its annual quota). While ITLOS’s decision did
not expressly mention the precautionary principle,58 at least two judges indicated the
provisional measures ordered were based on precaution.59 Judge Laing raised the question of whether the precautionary principle should reverse the onus of proof to the party
wishing to increase catch levels, but he felt the question should be left to full arbitration
for consideration.60 Unfortunately, the arbitral tribunal found that it lacked jurisdiction in
the case and, therefore, the merits of precaution were not addressed.61

Rough Seas
Three areas of marine environmental protection stand out for the cautious approaches to
precaution being taken in light of the large threats to the marine environment. States
have yet to forge effective and firm precautionary approaches to climate change, hazardous chemicals, and overfishing.62
Climate Change
The threats to the marine environment of global warming are broad and serious. Coral
bleaching, associated with warming ocean temperatures, has affected all tropical regions
of the globe, including the Andaman Sea off Thailand,63 and in some areas of the Indian
Ocean mortality of reefs from bleaching has neared 90%.64 Island States, such as the
Maldives and Marshall Islands, face major inundations, and vast areas of low-lying coastal
states are predicted to experience increased flooding, accelerated erosion, loss of wetlands and mangroves, and seawater intrusion into freshwater sources. 65 Potential damages to infrastructure in coastal areas from sea level rise have been predicted to be tens
of billions of dollars for individual countries, for example, Vietnam, Egypt, and Poland.66 The Arctic Ocean has reportedly lost some 40% of its sea-ice thickness in recent
decades,67 and the increasing ice melt has raised scientific concerns over the possible
breakdown of the global heat pump system. Warmer, less saline ocean waters in the
Arctic may disrupt the global current system, driven by sinking cold waters, from the
North with negative effects on various countries, especially in Scandinavia and Russia.68
While skeptics of the human causes of climate change still remain,69 the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), in its release of a third assessment report in
2001, was quite conclusive as to the growing certainty of greenhouse gas emissions
from human sources being a major contributor to global warming. The IPCC stated: “In
light of new evidence and taking into account the remaining uncertainties, most of the
observed warming over the last 50 years is likely to have been due to the increase in
greenhouse gas concentrations.”70
Strong precautionary approaches to climate change have yet to be worked out. The
Framework Convention on Climate Change itself adopted a weak, utilitarian version
of precaution71 and the subsequent Kyoto Protocol72 represents only a feeble response.
Developed countries accepted rather minimal reduction commitments for greenhouse
gas emissions, an overall target of at least 5% from 1990 levels by 2008–2012, and
many developed countries are actually increasing emissions rather than cutting back.73
In March 2001, the United States administration rocked the Kyoto boat by announcing
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its intention not to ratify the Protocol because of the Protocol’s exemption of developing
countries from reduction commitments and potential damage to the U.S. economy.74
Although the Kyoto Protocol has been at least partly salvaged through political
commitments under the Bonn Agreements,75 and working out some of the rules for the
flexibility mechanisms (emission trading, joint implementation and the clean development mechanism) at the Seventh Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change in Marrakesh, Morocco in November 2001,76 the
Protocol still likely faces a rough future. Second commitment period allocations remain
to be negotiated. Developing countries have not committed to reductions in greenhouse
gas emissions. While key parameters of a compliance regime have been agreed to, including a compliance committee having facilitative and enforcement branches, it is the
prerogative of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the
Kyoto Protocol to decide the legal form of compliance procedures and mechanisms.
Administrative and financial complexities surrounding the flexibility mechanisms may
divert attention from broader issues such as the critical need to invest much more in
research and development of renewable energy sources and the need to promote decentralized and less consumptive societies.77
Hazardous Chemicals
The threats of hazardous chemicals in the marine environment are also substantial. Persistent organic pollutants (POPs), including various pesticides such as dieldrin, DDT,
toxaphene, chlordane, as well as industrial compounds (PCBs) and combustion byproducts
(dioxins and furans), are found in all the world’s oceans.78
Their ability to bioaccumulate and persist in the environment raise carcinogenic,
reproductive, and other threats to both humans and marine wildlife.79 Of special concern
is the long-range transport from North America, Europe, Russia, and Asia of POPs and
heavy metals (such as cadmium and mercury from coal burning and other industries)
into the Arctic, which acts as a pollutant sink.80 Indigenous peoples, highly dependent
on country foods, are especially at risk given the tendency of POPs to concentrate in the
fatty tissues of wildlife, and levels of POPs have been found to be 10 to 20 times higher
in northern residents than in those in the South.81
Global responses to date have been fragmented and feeble.82 The 1998 Convention
on the Prior Informed Consent Procedure for Certain Hazardous Chemicals and Pesticides in International Trade83 does not prohibit trade in hazardous chemicals banned or
severely restricted by countries, but tries to facilitate trade subject to a prior informed
consent (PIC) procedure. For the 31 chemicals listed as subject to PIC, exporting states
must ensure importing states receive notice and consent to proposed chemical shipments.84 The Convention has not yet entered into force and had only 16 ratifications as
of 1 September 2001 of the required 50 ratifications for entry into force.85 No global
convention governs heavy metals. The Global Programme of Action for the Protection
of the Marine Environment from Land-Based Activities does set out national, regional,
and global priority actions for POPs and heavy metals, but the document is largely
aspirational without firm financing to assist countries in addressing problems.86
The Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants,87 while recognizing
the precautionary principle as an objective, may be described as a case of chemical
tinkering.88 The Convention, adopted in May 2001, only addresses an initial 12 chemicals (the “dirty dozen”)89 and is not firm on elimination. For example, countries are
required to make “determined efforts” to phase out PCB-containing equipment by 2025,90
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and DDT use will be allowed to continue for disease control.91 Specific exemptions up
to five years may be registered by parties for limited uses of many of the chemicals
listed for elimination in Annex A.92 Each party is required to take measures to reduce
total releases of unintentionally produced POPs listed in Annex C (dioxins, furans, hexachlorobenzene, PCBs), but the goal is stated as “minimization and, where feasible, ultimate elimination.”93 The Convention promotes a risk assessment approach to adding
new POPs for control which does not bode well for prompt and strong precautionary
actions.94 The Convention is not a comprehensive chemicals treaty95 addressing the huge
number of synthetic chemicals available for commercial use, estimated between 50,000
and 100,000, with some 1,000 new chemicals entering the economy each year.96
A time lag for entry into force is also likely of at least 3–4 years. The Convention
requires 50 ratifications.97
Negotiation of a comprehensive chemicals convention is not on the immediate political horizon. The United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) has emphasized
the need for enhanced coherence and efficiency among international chemical activities
and has stopped short of calling for a proactive and comprehensive treaty. At the 21st
session of UNEP’s Governing Council, the Governing Council in decision 21/7 on Chemicals
Management merely requested the Executive Director, in consultation with Governments,
the Inter-Organization Program for the Sound Management of Chemicals, the Intergovernmental Forum on Chemical Safety, and other relevant organizations and stakeholders,
to examine the need for a strategic approach to international chemicals management and
to prepare a report for consideration by the Governing Council/Global Ministerial Environmental Forum in 2002.98
Overfishing
Dwindling fish stocks, linked with frail fisheries management,99 is a further crisis area
where the precautionary approach is facing major challenges.100 Many of the world’s
major fish stocks have been overexploited or are being fully exploited.101 Illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing in world fisheries is a major concern in both national
zones of jurisdiction and on the high seas.102 Excess fishing capacity, by-catch, and
discarding of fish at sea continue to be identified in the Secretary General’s Report to
the UN General Assembly on Oceans and the Law of the Sea as grave issues for the
international community.103
The precautionary approach has crept into fisheries management generally through
the FAO Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries, which was adopted in 1995.104
Article 6.5 in the general principles section provides:
States and sub-regional and regional fisheries management organizations
should apply the precautionary approach widely to conservation, management and exploitation of living aquatic resources in order to protect them
and preserve the aquatic environment, taking into account the best scientific
evidence available. The absence of adequate scientific information should
not be used as a reason for postponing or failing to take measures to conserve target species, associated or dependent species and non-target species
and their environment.
Article 7.5 spells out further specifics for precautionary implementation. States are
urged to determine target reference points (a desirable level of fishing) and limit refer-
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ence points (conservation levels not to be exceeded) as well as management actions to
be taken if target or limit reference points are exceeded. For new or exploratory fisheries, states are urged to adopt as soon as possible cautious conservation and management
measures, including catch and effort limits. States are also called upon to adopt emergency conservation and management measures if a natural phenomenon has a significant
adverse impact on the status of living aquatic resources.
Additional technical guidelines on the precautionary approach to capture fisheries105
highlight the major concerns of fishing nations not to be bound by extreme precautionary measures. While the guidelines urge all fishing activities be subject to prior review
and authorization, including management plans,106 the guidelines are not explicit on the
burden and standard of proof. The guidelines call for the “appropriate placement of the
burden of proof”107 but avoid a clear statement of allocation. No concrete standard of
proof is suggested. Instead a flexible approach is recommended: “The standard of proof
to be used in decisions regarding authorization of fishing activities should be commensurate with the potential risk to the resource, while also taking into account the expected
benefits of the activities.”108 The requirement for a proponent of fishing to establish “no
harm” is essentially rejected through the statement: “although the precautionary approach
to fisheries may require cessation of fishing activities that have potentially serious adverse impacts, it does not imply that no fishing can take place until all potential impacts
have been assessed and found to be negligible.”109
The 1995 UN Convention on Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish
Stocks,110 while requiring Parties to apply the precautionary approach,111 also displays a
cautious embrace of precaution. A main thrust of the Convention is to require states and
regional fisheries organizations to adopt precautionary target and limit references with
agreed upon management actions should limits be exceeded. The Convention at least
partially promotes a quantification and expert systems approach to fisheries management
by requiring limit reference points to be based at a minimum on maximum sustainable
yield (MSY). The Convention leaves precautionary implementation details to be worked
out largely by subregional and regional organizations. Regional fisheries organizations,
such as the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organization (NAFO), have largely focused on
scientific modelling and debating of reference points without a broader discussion of
alternative fisheries management approaches.112 The issues of burden of proof shifting 113
and standard of proof are not being emphasized.114

Rising Normative Tides
While various forces may combine to weaken and narrow the normative implications of
precaution, such as political skepticism115 and institutional favoritism toward scientific
rationality, 116 two broad currents in international law promise to strengthen the precautionary principle, although the “tidal heights” remain uncertain. Human rights relating to
the environment, such as the right to a healthy environment, the right of children to a
clean environment, and indigenous rights to environmental protection, continue to evolve
and may add pressure for strict precautionary measures. The concept of sustainable development, even though controversial117 and amorphous,118 has spawned or at least popularized
other principles,119 including intergenerational equity, polluter pays, public participation,
community-based management, integration, and ecosystem management, which are likely
to increasingly synergize with precaution.
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Human Rights Developments
While no global treaty or declaration explicitly recognizes a right to a healthy environment,120 various wellsprings may nourish normative development. Over 50 national constitutions have entrenched some form of right to environmental protection.121 Various
cases and commentators have suggested a right to a healthy environment may be inherent in other rights122 such as rights to life, liberty, and security of person found the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,123 or the right of everyone to the
enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health in the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.124 Draft Principles on
Human Rights and the Environment would go further and recognize various rights,
including the “right to a secure, healthy and ecologically sound environment” and the
“right to freedom from pollution” that threatens life or health.125
The right of the child to a clean environment is receiving increased commentary,126
and various provisions in the 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child127 may support arguments for such a right. For example, Article 24 calls upon Parties to “recognize
the right of the child to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of health” and
to provide “adequate nutritious foods and clean drinking-water, taking into consideration
the dangers and risks of environmental pollution. . . .”128
The relationship between the precautionary approach and indigenous rights and practices
is also an evolving field of inquiry129 and one can expect indigenous groups to use
various arguments to support strong environmental protection measures.130 While various indigenous rights may be claimed,131 the right to environmental integrity may be
drawn from the Biodiversity Convention132 and the UN Draft Declaration on the Rights
of Indigenous Peoples.133 The latter, in Article 28, provides that “Indigenous Peoples
have the right to the conservation, restoration and protection of the total environment
and the productive capacity of their lands, territories and resources, as well as to assistance for this purpose from States and through international cooperation. . . .”134
While considerable controversy has arisen over human right approaches135 to environmental protection, particularly over such issues as whether such rights are substantive or procedural136 and the precise content of rights,137 rights-based arguments are likely
to be increasingly linked with the precautionary principle/approach.138 The notions of a
clean, healthy environment support strong versions of precaution, such as virtual elimination of toxic substance discharges; phase-outs and substitutions of hazardous substances;
and a reverse listing approach to chemicals management.139
With difficulties remaining over the ability of individuals to enforce human rights at
the international level,140 it seems likely that judicial review, linking human rights and
precaution, will increasingly be sought at the national level.141 Recent cases from the
Supreme Court of Canada appear to have set the stage for such linking,142 with the Court
indicating a liberal attitude towards incorporating international law norms into domestic
law through a contextual approach to statutory interpretation and judicial review of administrative decisions.143
Synergies with Other Principles of Sustainable Development
The precautionary principle/approach does not “swim alone.” Various other principles
of sustainable development promise to affect the normative evolution of precaution.144
For example, intergenerational equity supports the notion of long-term planning and
placing the burden on proponents of change to consider long-term environmental and

The Precautionary Principle and Marine Environmental Protection

175

cultural impacts.145 Public participation may be central to precaution in that public perceptions of risk and acceptability are given a voice.146 Community-based management
supports the movement from centralized management to new forms of community regulation based on sustainable community economies.147 The “polluter pays” principle, through
the imposition of strict and absolute liability regimes, may push industries towards greater
pollution prevention and precaution.148
The integration principle may also nourish precaution. For example, the need to
integrate fisheries management with broader coastal area management has been recognized in Article 10 of the Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries. Additional Technical Guidelines on Integration of Fisheries into Coastal Area Management149 recognize
the need for various adaptations of the precautionary approach,150 including prohibitions
on activities in narrow circumstances: “If the outcome of an activity is totally uncertain
in the sense that even the range of possible outcomes is unknown, the guiding rule
should be to avoid activities that might have irreversible consequences since their potential costs are incalculable.”151
The principle of ecosystem-based management may also be closely linked to the
precautionary principle.152 Given the complexities of ecosystems and associated scientific uncertainties, the ecosystem approach has numerous implications for marine management, including the need to expand conservation efforts beyond target fish stocks to
marine biodiversity health;153 the need to establish no-take reserves in order to study the
true ecosystem effects of fishing and other activities;154 the need for effective monitoring
of fisheries and ecosystems and separation of scientific institutions from management;155
and the need to protect threatened and endangered marine species.156
The overall concept or principle of sustainable development may itself, of course,
influence precautionary decision-making.157 Given the need to balance environmental,
economic, and social equities, a shift from prescriptive to adaptive management has
been urged.158 Justice Weeramantry, in his Separate Opinion in the Hungary v. Slovakia
case, viewed the principle of sustainable development as a vehicle for reconciling the
principles of right to development and the right to environmental protection.159 He indicated that there is a duty to ensure that development projects do not significantly damage the environment.160
The potential for the concept of sustainable development/management to modify
the potential harshness of precaution by allowing limited developments is demonstrated
in a couple of New Zealand aquaculture cases. In Trio Holdings v. Marlborough District Council,161 the Planning Tribunal, applying a precautionary approach, substantially
curbed a marine farming proposal by requiring deletion of a habitat area important to a
threatened species (king shag) and refusing consent for mussel farming with related
impacts of shell litter and feces. The Tribunal indicated that allowing limited sponge
farming for antitumor drug development would be in accord with the concept of sustainable management. In Pigeon Bay Aquaculture Ltd. v. Canterbury Regional Council,162
the Environment Court allowed two mussel farming proposals to proceed but refused
consent for the growing of dredge oysters and scallops due to the lack of evidence
regarding environmental effects.

Conclusion
A number of images help capture the relationship of the precautionary principle to marine environmental protection. The principle has created “slippery shores” where it is
difficult to get a firm conceptual grip for numerous reasons, including the broad array of
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precautionary measures possible, the ongoing philosophical debates over how precautionary societies should be, and lack of clarity in how to institutionalize precaution in
law and policy. The precautionary principle is facing “rough seas” in trying to adequately
address climate change, hazardous chemical risks, and overfishing, with strong political
and economic waves hindering strong precautionary courses. Human rights relating to
the environment and various principles of sustainable development are “rising tides”
promising to synergize with precaution in normative evolution.
The precautionary principle is not a panacea. The principle promises little in addressing some of the underlying causes of environmental degradation, population growth,
poverty, and overconsumption. The commodification of nature, fuelled by market economies and globalization pressures, continues with hard-to-counter assumptions of industrialism, managerialism, and scientism.163 The principle is still in its infancy, with few
countries actually implementing the principle in legislation and limited public education
and debate. Even if precaution is embraced in law, lack of political will and limited human
and financial resources may hinder implementation. Precautionary standard-setting at the
international level is thwarted by state sovereignty concerns and the lack of effective
global governance, such as an empowered world environment organization.164
The precautionary principle is not an endpoint but helps chart a course. The principle plots new directions for governance. No longer should regulators or the public
have to demonstrate environmental harm before precautionary measures are required.
No longer should technical experts and other professionals be the sole voices in deciding safety and acceptability.165 No longer should corporate and human interests automatically trump biodiversity values.
The principle also points directions for societal and technological change. Cleaner
technologies, 166 greater understanding and respect for nature and cultures, and less intrusive industrial approaches (such as organic agriculture, ecoforestry, and ecotourism) are
called for.167
Given the broad policy implications to so many resource sectors, from aquaculture
and fisheries to pollution control and to so many levels of governance (local, national,
regional, and international), a major challenge will be to track the progress of the precautionary principle.168 This paper provides a partial gauging, but it remains to be seen
how high the tides of precaution will be.

Postscript
The MOX Plant case between Ireland and the United Kingdom, having a Provisional
Measures Order issued by the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea on 3 December 2001 and proceeding to arbitration pursuant to Annex VII of the Convention of
the Law of the Sea,169 may further develop the international jurisprudence relating to
precaution. Ireland is challenging a United Kingdom decision to authorize and allow
operation of a mixed oxide fuel facility in Sellafield adjacent to the Irish Sea. While
various procedural and substantial arguments are being put forward, a central argument
of Ireland is that the precautionary principle places the burden on the United Kingdom
to demonstrate that no harm would arise from discharges and other consequences of
operating the MOX plant.
The provisional measures stage of litigation did not result in detailed or conclusive
judicial articulations regarding precaution. The Tribunal’s Order did not enter into a
discussion of the precautionary approach but merely noted in paragraph 84 that “prudence and caution require that Ireland and the United Kingdom cooperate in exchanging
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information concerning risks or effects of the operation of the MOX plant and in devising ways to deal with them. . . .” The separate opinion of Judge Wolfrum noted that it is
still a matter of discussion whether the precautionary principle/approach has become
part of international customary law, and there is no general agreement as to the consequences flowing from the principle other than the burden of proof concerning the possible impact of a given activity being reversed. The separate opinion of Judge Treves
regretted that the Tribunal had not been more explicit in giving reasons for deciding not
to suspend commissioning of the MOX plant. Judge Treves indicated that an underlying
reason for not substantively invoking the precautionary approach was:
[T]he scientific arguments brought by the parties did not focus precisely
enough on whether the commissioning of the MOX plant could produce a
significant increment, or the risk of a significant increment, of the radioactivity in the Irish sea during the few months before the Annex VII arbitral
tribunal could be seized of a request concerning provisional measures.170
Judge Ad Hoc Székely, in a further separate opinion, was especially critical of the
Tribunal’s judgment in light of the precautionary principle. He found it surprising that
the Tribunal, without any basis in law or science, gave the United Kingdom and not
Ireland the benefit of the doubt regarding the risk of harm alleged by Ireland. However,
he believed the procedural measures ordered by the Tribunal for further cooperation and
consultations were based upon considerations deriving from a precautionary approach.
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